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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE HISTORY OF SELECTIVE SERVICE
Conscription, the exaction by the state of military service, is not
new. Since the seventeenth century many experiments have been
made in compulsory service. Insufficient standing armies, unreliable
reserves, and volunteers resulted in a system of universal conscription.
Its adoption by one nation led to emulation by others.
The first moves toward conscription in the modern sense were
made by the French monarchy in the late seventeenth century. 1  The
statesman Louvois in 1688 conscripted certain non-exempt groups of
citizens for temporary service. They were drawn by lot in the parishes
of the kingdom. They were not amalgamated with the regular troops
but were used at interior posts, on lines of communication, and for
the occupation of conquered areas.2
In the period of the French Revolution, various measures em-
bodying the idea of conscription were attempted. The most successful
was the 1793 plan which made all able-bodied men between 18 and 25
liable to service.2 Under the Napoleonic ±egime universal military
service led to many of Napoleon's victories and furnished the outline
for extension of the system into newly-annexed territory. Because
of the abuse of buying exemptions under the French Act, conscription
did not persist in France.
It remained for Prussia to furnish the truest example of con-
scripted military service.4 Humbled by Napoleon's Treaty of Tilsit
(1807), Prussia was compelled to reduce her army to 42,000. The
glory of Frederick the Great's professional force was destroyed and
Prussia was receptive to a peace-time plan of compulsory military
service. Between 1807 and 1813 Baron Von Stein and General Von
Scharnhorst effected military reforms in Prussia which had far reach-
ing effects in the subsequent use of conscription. They discarded
hired mercenaries, stopped the enlistment of foreigners, abolished class
distinctions, special municipal and class exemptions, and apportioned
military service territorially. Germany owed her strength during the
19th century to this plan and all Europe was affected by it. 5
123 ENCYC. BRITIANNICA, War, 322 (1936); 6 id. Conscription, at 283.
See JEAN, L'ARMEE NOUVELLE (Paris, 1914).
2 Colby, Conscription 4 ENCYC. SOC. SCIENCES (1931) 220. See Marcus,
Some Aspects of Military Service (1941) 39 MICH. L. REV. 913, 928.
3 "In 1798 at the instance of General Jourdan the principle of conscrip-
tion was incorporated in the constitution, and thus the French army
became entitled to the service of every able-bodied citizen between
the ages of 20 and 25." 4 ENCYC. SOC. SCIENCES (1931), op. cit.
supra at 221.
4 Colby, Conscription in Moden Form (1929) 34 INFANTRY TOURNAL
645, 648. Note (1915-16)) 6 ACADE Y OF POLITICAL SCIENCE PRO-
CEEDINGS 4.
G "German effectiveness in 1870 startled the world, and since that time
England has been the only great power in Europe that has not
adopted conscription as a defensive measure even in peace-time."
Ford, Boyen's Military Law (1915) 20 AM. HIST. REV. 528.
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The effect of conscription in Japan is especially significant. When
the nation developed beyond the tribal system, the Samurai, a military
caste, became the exclusive fighters of the country. After the Meiji
restoration in 1868 there came a great increase in national spirit.
The first step was the destruction of feudalism and of the military
class, whose exclusive possession of political power had resulted in a
decline in imperial strength. In 1873 under the influence of a French
military mission, conscription was adopted and military service was
opened to all classes. A German mission carried on instruction from
1885 to 1894, and since that time, the army, conscripted from what
previously had been considered the non-fighting classes, has been a
well organized unit.6
The term "universal selective service" has added significance in
the light of English history. Under the Tudors, Stuarts and other
kings there were sporadic but unsuccessful attempts to raise armies
by conscription.7 Cromwell's advent to power created a well-disciplined
standing army. His military rule, however, made standing armies so
unpopular that the American colonies resisted their establishment even
in behalf of the Revolutionary cause.5 In 1803, there was a draft
of all men from 17 to 55 to meet anticipated French invasion. How-
ever, during the remainder of the 19th century Britain fell away from
universal military training and employed professional troops for co-
lonial warfare.9
At the beginning of the World War, Britain relied wholly on
the already established system 'of voluntary enlistment to supply the
need for manpower. The plan, however, was ineffective. A subse-
quent conscription attempt failed; and thus in 1915 a complete in-
ventory of England's manpower was taken as a result of the Ka-
tional Registration Act.10 A general conscription act was passed in
1916.11 Poor methods of classification and exemption were employed.
Thus this plan partially failed also.12
As a result of the World War, conscription was forbidden in
Austria, Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey.'3 But in March,
1935, Chancellor Hitler announced universal military conscription in
Germany despite protests from Great Britain, France and Italy1
4
6 TAKATA, CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM IN JAPAN (1921) passim.
7 See brief of plaintiff-in-error, page 9 Selective Draft Law Cases, 245
U. S. 366 (1917). See (1941) 39 MICH. L. REV. op. cit. supra at 929.
8 Army and Navy Selective Service Com., AMERICAN SELECTIVE SERVICE
(1939); CROWDER, THE SPIRIT Or SELECTIVE SERWvCE (1920) 51 et. seq.
9 PRENDERGAST, THE LAW RELATING TO OFFICERS IN THE ARMY (1855)
38 (referring to service expeditions to Ireland).
105 & 6 GEO. v, c. 60 (1915).
116 & 7 GEo. v, c. 15 (1916).
.2 Army and Navy Selective Service Com., AMERICAN SELECTIVE SERVICE
(1939).
13 (1935) International Conciliation 264, 271. See, ARMY WAR COLLEGE,
STATISTICAL COMPARISON OF UNIVERSAL AND VOLUNTARY MILITARY
SERVICE (1915) 9.
14 7 ENCYC. AMERICANA, Conscription (1938) 544. But see, LEAGUE OF
NATIONS ARMAMENTS YEAR BOOK 1928-29 (Geneva, 1929) (contains
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The impending threat of war and a growing belief in the in-
efficacy of the appeasement policy led Great Britain to enact the
"British Military Training Act" in May 1939.15 With the declaration
of war in September of 1939 the act was superceded by the National
Service (Armed Forces) Act of 1939.16
The American Experience
As early as 1774 some of the colonies were preparing for war
with England. In 1775 the Continental Congress passed measures
recommending the creation of a militia. There was no strong central
government and the burden of raising and equipping troops was placed
wholly on each colony. Thus, there was no national control and di-
rection permitting utilization of resources to the greatest wartime ad-
vantage. Voluntary enlistment proved wholly inadequate although
large bounties were offered as inducements. Short training periods
created only raw troops which had little chance for success against
the well-trained opposition.17
The Constitution of the United States authorized the federal
government to raise and maintain an army,'8 and it was the manifested
intent to give this power exclusively to the federal government and
leave none to the states.'9 Public opinion, however, was in favor of
leaving national defense to the militia, and it took generations to over-
come these prejudices. 20 Washington, Jefferson, Adams, Knox, and
other leaders of the period urged the adoption of a selective service
plan to create a well regulated army, but they did not live to see it
become law.21 Instead, the militia of 1792 was organized, and it
detailed information concerning the extent and duration of com-
pulsory military service among the principal nations).
2 & 3 GEO. VI, c. 25 (1939); Keith, Notes on Imperial Constitutional
Law (1939) 21 j. COMP. LEG. INT. L. 251, 252. ("This act is re-
markable as the first enactment to be passed in time of peace
authorizing a form of conscription in this country. It is of a
temporary character to continue in force for three years from
the date of its passing May 26, 1939. This act applies generally
to male British subjects between 20 and 21 years of age ordinarily
resident in Great Britain with special provisions for Scotland with
power given to extend it to British subjects ordinarily resident
outside Great Britain and to the Isle of Mann.")
1632 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND (1939) 591 to 592; 2 & 3 GEO. vi,
c. 81 (1939). See (1941) 39 MICH. L. REV. op. cit. supra at 930
for the provisions of compulsory military service as applied by
the dominions and colonies of Great Britain.
17 Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366, 379 (1917). Army and
Navy Selective Service Com., AMERICAN SELECTIVE SERVICE (1939)
7; PALMER, WASHINGTON, LINCOLN, WILSON: THREE WAR STATESMEN
(1930) 35, 84, 263; WOOD, AMERICA'S DUTY AS SHOWN BY OUR
MrILITARY HISTORY (1921) 84-116.
I8U. S. CONST. ART. I, § 10.
19 Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366, 381 (1917).
20Army and Navy Selective Service Com., AMERICAN SELECTIVE SERVICE
(1939) 7.
21 WOOD, .A-MIERICA'S DUTY AS SHOWN BY OUR MILITARY HISTORY (1921)
53-83.
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proved to be less effective than the one employed during the Revolu-
tion.22
During the war of 1812, the volunteer system of enlistment again
failed in spite of extravagant bounties. The militia claimed consti-
tutional exemption from foreign service and often refused to leave
the United States. The national government conducted the war, but
the troops were supplied by and were responsible to the state govern-
ments from which they came. 23 Throughout the war the record of our
navy was excellent, but that of our army was poor. The United
States repeated every major blunder of the Revolution.2 4
In the ensuing Florida and Indian wars, our regular army was
slightly increased;25 but nevertheless it was too small to meet the op-
position, and was supplemented with a poorly trained militia which
increased the cost of fighting by prolonging the duration of the war.26
By the time of the Mexican War the United States had profited
somewhat by past mistakes. But failure to make enlistments for the
duration of the war prolonged hostilities. 27 The regular army was
small and many volunteers had to be used. Less reliance was placed
on the militia, which was beneficial as the regular army was com-
posed of better trained soldiers.28 Thus far, however, the war had
been our best conducted and most successful; the systems employed
had been equally inefficient as those of previous years, and our suc-
cess was attained, not as a result, but in spite of them.29
At the outset, the Union enlisted only 75,000 militia for a period
of three months and expected to win the war within that time. The
South began with a one year enlistment period, giving them a decisive
advantage. Lincoln' soon recognized the weaknesses of the plan and
immediately introduced recruiting for three years or the duration.
There were practically no volunteers, however, so the government
ordered a draft of 300,000 militia to serve nine months. This militia
draft and the volunteer plan, which still remained, created a most
confusing system of recruiting. The call did little but provide green
troops at great expense. As a last resort, National Conscription was
introduced in 1863, and was not successful.3o
The draft was introduced two years too late and was only a means
of forcing those to fight who had failed to volunteer. Volunteering
continued and the draft was applied to only those districts which failed
22 Army and Navy Selective Service Com., AiMEICAN SELECTIVE SERVICE
(1939) 7.
23 Id. at 18.
2 4 WOOD, AMERICA'S DUTY AS SHOWN BY OUR MILITARY HISTORY (1921)
124-129.
25 Id at 134.
2 6 PALMER, WASHINGTON, LINCOLN AND WILSON: THREE WAR STATESMEN
(1930) 148.
27 Army and Navy Selective Service Com., AMERICAN SELECTIVE SERVICE
(1939) 8.
28 WOOD, OUR MILITARY HISTORY (1916) 145-148.
29 Ibid.
20 Army and Navy Selective Service Com., AMERICAN SELECTIVE SERVICE
(1939) 9.
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to fill their quotas by other methods. Hence the drafted man and the
district from which he came were labeled as disloyal. Inefficient house
to house registration was conducted solely by the federal government.
Recruiting costs were thirty times as great as necessary. Further-
more, the drafted man could hire a substitute which tended to lower
the standards of patrotism.s' In almost every respect, the draft and
volunteer plan failed.3 2
The United States entered the World War and simultaneously
adopted compulsory military service. The plan authorized: (1) se-
lective service for those between twenty-one and thirty years of age,
(2) concurrent voluntary recruiting, and (3) prescribed service for
the duration of the emergency. Bounties, substitutes, and purchased
exemptions were forbidden. Only ministers, divinity students, and
high public officials were exempt. Conscientious objectors were only
freed from actual fighting. The state was the unit established for
quota allotments which were based on total population.83 Subsequent
amendments changed the quota basis from total population to total
Class I registrants, provided for registration of new men, and extended
the draft age.E4 Responsibility for registration, classification, phys-
ical examination, induction, transportation, and related problems were
placed in local boards. 35 The plan was considered a success because
it was efficient and fostered the theory of military obligation of
citizenship.36
The World War did not pass without its mistakes, however.
At the time of our entry we were unprepared, unorganized, and
unequipped. The regular army and the reserves were not well
trained in war methods. The cost of the war was excessive and
our errors caused losses from which it took years to recover.37
While the United States has relied upon voluntary enlistment
for the maintenance of a small standing army since World War I,
Congress in 1920 placed upon the General Staff the problem of pre-
paring plans for the mobilization of the manpower of the nation38
In accordance with this congressional mandate the Joint Army and
Navy Selective Service Committee, formed in 1926, prepared rules
and regulations for mobilizing the manpower of the nation. The
adoption of the present Selective Service System, patterned after that
of 1917-18, represents every major aim decided upon by tins Joint
Committee. 39 Following the United States' declaration of war, the
33 SECOND REPORT OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL TO THE SECRETARY
OF WAR ON THE SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM (1919) passtm.
32W00D, OUR MILITARY HISTORY (1916) 157-158.
33 40 STAT. 76, 50 U. S. C. A. § 226 (1917).
34 40 STAT. 557-558, 40 STAT. 995, 50 U. s. 0. A. § 226 note (1918).
35 SECOND REPORT OF THE PROVOST MARSHALL GENERAL TO THE SECRETARY
OF WAR ON OPERATIONS OF THE SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM (1919)
279-280.
3 W0D, AMERICA'S DUTY (1926) 216-237.
3 Ibid.
38 Heanngs on H. R. 10182, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1940)' 67, 112.
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Selective Training and Service Act was amended to provide for regis-
tration of all male residents of the United States between the ages of
18 and 65.40
Conscription as a recruiting measure in war time has proved to
be inevitable. Moreover, the conscription system produces a leveling,
a community of citizenship, and an awakening realization of the per-
tinence of the burdens of government which arises from the basic con-
ception that military service should rest not upon ardor, mercenary
motive, or social class but simply upon the duties of membership. in
the political association for whose maintenance and defense an army
is formed.
CLASSIFICATION
In conscription, just as in other activities where government as-
sumes the task of directing the actions of individuals, rules of pro-
cedure are necessary. Thus, a rigid adherence to rules prescribing
procedure for registration, classification and induction are necessary
if the policy of equal treatment is to be effective.1 In the case of
classification, prejudice to a registrant may arise where he seeks to
introduce claims for deferment. 2 Such claims must be presented to the
local board before classification has been made.3 After classification
the registrant may take advantage of the provisions of the Selective
Service Regulations concerning reopening of classification, 4 appeal, r,
or personal appearance6 for determining questions of deferment.
The registrant may be considered classified only when he has been
39 Conscription, THE AMERICANA ANNUAL (1941) 184; Selective Service,
BRITANNICA BOOK OF THE YEAR (1941) 604 et seq. (a detailed dis-
cussion of the organization of the Joint Army and Navy Selective
Service Committee).
40 55 STAT. 627 (1940), 50 U. S. C. A. § 357 et seq. (Supp. 1941). For a
detailed discussion of the provisions of the Selective Training and
Service Act of 1940 as amended see Notes (1942) 17 IND. L. T. inf'a.
1 Sel. Ser. Reg. § 623.1 (c) (1942).
2Application of Greenberg, 39 F. Supp. 13, 15 (D.N.J. 1941). A
registrant was placed in Class I on December 3, 1940. On Jan-
uary 3, 1941 he was given his physical examination. The following
day he was married. On January 7 registrant was placed in
class I-A. The court found that January 7 was the date of
classification and therefore, the local board properly considered
registrant's claims for deferment because of dependency. The
Board of Appeal considered December 3, 1940, as the date Green-
berg was classified and disregarded any information in the reg-
istrant's file concerning the question of dependency. Thus the
Board of Appeal in effect denied Greenberg a right of appeal on
the question of dependency.
3 Sel. Ser. Reg. § 623.2 (1942)4 Sel. Ser. Reg. Part 626 Reopening and Considering Anew Regis-
trants's Classification (1942)
5 SeL Ser. Reg. Part 627 Appeal to Board of Appeal (1942)
a Sel. Ser. Reg. § 625.1 (1942)
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